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1 The epistemology of Otto Hölder
This special issue is devoted to the philosophical ideas developed by Otto
Hölder (1859-1937), a mathematician who made important contributions to
analytic functions and group theory. Hölder’s substantial work on the foun-
dations of mathematics and the general philosophical conception outlined in
this work are, however, still largely unknown. Up to the present, philosophical
interest in Hölder’s work has been limited to his axiomatic formulation of a
theory of measurable quantities published in 1901 in the article The Axioms
of Quantity in the Theory of Measurement. This article attracted the in-
terest, among others, of Louis Couturat, Ernst Nagel, and Patrick Suppes.
More recent historical studies ([Ehrlich 2006], [Radu 2003]) have explored
other aspects of Hölder’s rich conception of the foundations of mathemat-
ics, against the historical background of the 19th century Grundlagenkrise,
emphasizing the rich interdependence between Hölder’s conception and ideas
proposed by Immanuel Kant, Hermann v. Helmholtz, Moritz Pasch, David
Hilbert, Hermann and Robert Graßmann, Giuseppe Veronese, and Rodolfo
Bettazzi. These studies opened up a broad field for further historical research.
A deeper understanding of Hölder’s ideas requires a more detailed analysis of
his logico-philosophical conception of the foundations of arithmetic, geometry,
and physics. It is our conviction that this goal would benefit substantially, on
the one hand, from a more widespread knowledge of Hölder’s earliest method-
ological publications and, on the other hand, from a closer examination of the
ideas found in Hölder’s last and most elaborate philosophical work.
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Hölder’s interest for the modern reader is both historical and theoretical:
from a historical point of view, Hölder belongs to a tradition of mathemati-
cians who, like Poincaré or Weyl, investigated the epistemology of mathe-
matics by taking the results of physics more into account than the results of
logic. The general oblivion into which his epistemology fell might be related
to the increased interest in the logical foundations of mathematics and set the-
ory. Hölder’s interest in other branches of mathematics, as discussed in The
Mathematical Method, are one of the reasons for the interest in his approach:
on the one hand it is oriented to case-studies and to an investigation of the
practice of mathematics; on the other hand it is centered on the notion of de-
duction, but does not reduce deduction to the relation of logical consequence.
For this reason, reading Hölder might be especially interesting for the investi-
gation of mathematical practice and the deductive inferences that are at play
in informal mathematical proofs.
2 Biography
Otto Hölder was born on December 22, 1859 in Stuttgart. He took up his stud-
ies in his native town and then moved to Berlin, where he studied mathematics
with Weierstraß, Kronecker and Kummer. Hölder then moved to Tübingen,
where he received his PhD in mathematics in 1882 under the direction of Paul
du Bois-Reymond with a thesis in potential theory (the study of harmonic
functions). In 1884 he went to Göttingen, where he obtained a PhD in phi-
losophy and wrote his Habilitationsschrift on Fourier series. In 1882 he met
Felix Klein in Leipzig, where he later became associate professor in 1889, after
having held such a position for seven years in Tübingen and then for a further
three years in Königsberg, where he became the successsor of Minkowski in
1896. In Leipzig, where he received the chair of Lie, he was the advisor of
students such as Emil Artin and Oskar Becker, and became member of the
Sächsische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Hölder died on August 29, 1937.
Hölder made important contributions to analysis and group theory, but
he also worked on geometry, algebra, measurement theory and epistemol-
ogy. His two main mathematical results—Hölder’s inequality and the Jordan-
Hölder-theorem—are still named after him. An interest in philosophical ques-
tions was already present at the beginning of his career, but from 1914
on, he concentrated almost exclusively on the foundations of geometry and
arithmetic and the role of deduction in mathematics and physics. The
results of this work merged ten years later in a comprehensive work Die
Mathematische Methode – Logisch erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung im
Gebiete der Mathematik, Mechanik und Physik (The Mathematical Method.
Logico-philosophical Investigations in the Domain of Mathematics, Mechanics,
and Physics), published in 1924. In this book Hölder reveals his doubts con-
cerning the possibility of expressing all mathematics through logical symbol-
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ism. From 1924 onwards, Hölder turned again to complex analysis and number
theory, but continued publishing on the foundations of mathematics.
3 Content of this volume
This issue contains English translations of two early epistemological texts by
Hölder—Intuition and Reasoning in Geometry from 1900 and his review of
Robert Graßmann’s Formenlehre, published in 1892—as well as four previously
unpublished articles discussing Hölder’s ideas in the light of 19th and early
20th century philosophy of mathematics.
Intuition and Reasoning in Geometry (1900) is Hölder’s inaugural lecture
given in Leipzig at the beginning of the academic year 1899. The published
text includes extensive notes added by Hölder that constitute almost two-
thirds of the volume (comparable only to Alexander von Humboldt’s Aspects
of Nature, notorious for its excessive annotation). Here, Hölder studies philo-
sophical problems raised by the methods used in geometry and, to some degree,
in mechanics. Hölder claims that no serious investigation of mathematical
method—e.g., of the special character of the reasoning used in mathematical
deduction from the axioms—is available. While mathematicians, on the one
hand, are concerned only with the construction of various systems of axioms,
and philosophers, on the other hand, are only looking for the sources of the
axioms, to be found either in experience or intuition, no one investigates the
deduction from axioms. In his inaugural lecture, Hölder begins a case by
case investigation of deductive methods used in mathematics and mechanics.
Even if a richer set of examples will be given only in his later work on The
Mathematical Method, the inaugural lecture already contains some fundamen-
tal examples, emphasizing the use of auxiliary lines in geometric constructions
and of arithmetic in the method of exhaustion. He comes to the conclusion
that mathematics and the exact sciences have a logic of their own: although
purely formal and completely exempt from intuition, deduction is not analyt-
ical. Rather, according to Hölder, in deduction we perform a thought exper-
iment which replaces real experiments and no longer deals with the objects
themselves, but with their mutual relations in thought.
It seems that there are not many traces of Intuition and Reasoning in
Geometry in the secondary literature. In a review of The Mathematical
Method, Edgar Zilsel praised the originality of the former work: “Already
a quarter century ago, the author, with his inaugural lecture Intuition and
Reasoning in Geometry, became engaged in the philosophical discussion on
the foundations of mathematics—and raised its level considerably” [Zilsel 1926,
646]. Nevertheless, Intuition and Reasoning in Geometry made no waves in
the literature and even today is known only to a small number of specialists.
The only direct trace in the literature seems to be the dispute with Ernst Mach
on the proof of the law of the lever (analyzed by Oliver Schlaudt in this vol-
ume). We think however that Hölder’s paper rightly deserves attention today,
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in particular in view of recent trends in philosophy of mathematics that focus
on case studies and mathematical practice, rejecting the identification between
the inference structure of mathematics and the deductive calculi developed in
classical logic.
The same holds for Hölder’s review of Robert Graßmann’s Theory of
Number or Arithmetic, which is—as the translator Mircea Radu rightly
remarks—less a confrontation with Robert Graßmann, than a first outline
of Hölder’s own account of axiomatics and of its limits in the foundation of
mathematics. As in the case of the inaugural lecture, this review already con-
tains a preliminary sketch of what Hölder will later develop in the 1924 volume.
Hölder compares two interpretations of Robert Graßmann’s Theory of Number,
which was meant as part of a project to restore the organic unity of the system
of mathematics by examining the specific process of sign-construction involved
in producing mathematical knowledge.
Biagioli’s paper provides a general introduction to the philosophy of geom-
etry at the end of the 19th century and presents the main topics developed by
Hölder in the inaugural lecture. The analysis of Hölder’s answers to the charge
of circularity raised by the Kantians to Helmholtz’s empiricism reveals that he
considers geometrical concepts to be empirical inasmuch as they are derived
from empirical experience, and as conditions of experience, inasmuch as they
are rules that allow us to infer further facts. Yet, Hölder not only reacts to the
epistemology of Kant and Helmholtz, inheriting the idea of some kind of a pri-
ori knowledge from the former and the empirical origin of several geometrical
concepts from the second. He also discusses the classical distinction between
geometry, which has axioms, and arithmetic, which is on the contrary based
on definitions, and accepts the new trend in philosophy of mathematics based
on the rejection of intuition in the development of rigorous proofs, further in-
vestigating the role of deduction in geometrical constructions. Biagioli’s paper
investigates how these features of Hölder’s epistemology can be interpreted
with respect to Kant’s own conception and to the neo-Kantian perspective of
Cassirer. On the one hand, there are some limits to Hölder’s understanding of
Kant’s remarks on pure intuition; on the other hand, Hölder’s logical analysis
of mathematical reasoning as a concatenation of relations has some resem-
blance to Cassirer’s conception of mathematics. Biagioli claims that Hölder,
like Cassirer, aims to develop a methodological synthesis of Kantianism and
empiricism that is grounded on a relational conception of the a priori.
Analyzing Hölder’s reply to Mach’s critique of the Archimedean proof
of the Law of the Lever, Oliver Schlaudt offers an exhaustive presentation
of one of the relevant case studies investigated in Intuition and Reasoning
in Geometry. Hölder’s interest in this mechanical example is related to his
understanding of deduction in science: like Mach he believed that in the
Archimedean proof the conclusion was implicitly contained in the premises.
Yet, while Mach argued that the Archimedean proof was circular—meaning
that it could not provide any further knowledge beyond the empirical facts
assumed in the premises—Hölder claimed that the proof is sound because it
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makes explicit something that is contained in the premises but is not epis-
temically accessible as such. Deduction is investigated as a means to order
mathematical truths, and the difference between the premises and the con-
clusion is related to the nature of the relational concepts contained in them.
Schlaudt associates the case study analyzed in 1899 with some remarks made
by Hölder in the 1924 volume, where he develops a theory of synthesis, claim-
ing that synthetic concepts have “hidden properties” that can be brought out
in further deductive steps. The detailed analysis of quantitative and qualita-
tive concepts and of metrical relations contained in the proof of the Law of the
Lever allows Schlaudt to make a connection between the critique of Mach and
Hölder’s understanding of logic, and in particular of the role of concept forma-
tion, which is a much more complicated process than nominal definitions. The
paper clearly shows how a bottom-up investigation of a specific mathematical
proof leads Hölder to develop an argumentative analysis of mathematical in-
ferences that is nearer to Vailati’s analysis of mechanics than to foundational
efforts to reformulate scientific theories as logical calculi.
The same idea is at the core of Hölder’s review of Robert Graßmann’s vol-
ume, as Mircea Radu shows in his contribution: disclaiming Graßmann’s idea
that rigor can be reached only by means of a transformation of scientific the-
ories into a thinking calculus—Leibniz’s utopian project—Hölder’s main aim
is to criticize the widespread confidence in symbolism and limit its possible
uses in mathematics. This is shown by Radu through an analysis of Hölder’s
conception of axiomatics and proof: Hölder believes that logic could not itself
be axiomatized, given that this would amount to the infinite regress of giving
a deductive account of the science of deduction; the same holds for metamath-
ematics, for a meta-mathematical proof of the consistency of mathematics
would run into the same regress, because at some point it would require an-
other system of axioms. Although Hölder does not support his claim with fully
developed philosophical reasonings, Radu shows convincingly how he derives
some arguments from the analysis of various mathematical proofs occurring
in geometry and arithmetic. Relying on several examples taken from The
Mathematical Method, Radu evaluates Hölder’s defense of the genetic against
the axiomatic method in the case of arithmetic. The two methods were op-
posed by Hilbert in Über den Zahlbegriff [On the concept of number], where
he remarked that even if the genetic method is mostly used in arithmetic,
whereas the axiomatic method is used in geometry, the axiomatic method
should be considered as preferable in both disciplines. According to the ge-
netic method, the general notion of real number is generated by successive
extensions of the concept of natural number: in particular one first defines
a number—the unit—and then further generates the other numbers together
with their rules. According to the axiomatic method, a set of entities is as-
sumed as existent from the beginning, together with their relations, and one
must afterwards prove the consistency of the axioms that state such relations.
Radu shows that Hölder’s idea that the genetic method should be primary is
related to a radically different conception of mathematical proof, based on the
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synthesis of concepts and on the idea that sequences of concepts of different
order are used in mathematical proofs. The genetic method is typical of math-
ematics and logic, which—unlike empirical sciences—are characterized by an
unclear distinction between the content of the theory and its form: e.g., the
sequence-concept is at the same time the content and the form of our thinking.
The difference between geometry and arithmetic is further explored in
the paper by Paola Cantù, where the distinction between given and con-
structed concepts is analyzed in order to show that the fundamental differ-
ence between the two disciplines does not concern the kind of objects these
sciences are applied to, but rather the different origin and formulation of
their concepts. While geometry contains some concepts that cannot be de-
fined synthetically, the arithmetical concepts are all synthetic—i. e., concepts
that have their source in some activity, as in the genetic method described
above. More precisely, arithmetical concepts are constructed in deductive
processes themselves, because “the abstraction of new general concepts and
rules thus forms in a way a constituent of deduction”. This analysis of the
opposition “given-constructed” allows Cantù to reconstruct Hölder’s position
with respect to Pasch, Helmholtz and Kant and provides several reasons why
Hölder, although evidently sharing an empiricist account of geometry, did
not attempt to advance a definitive argument against the Kantian under-
standing of mathematics. The difference between arithmetic and geometry
and the role played by axioms and experience in it are then used to under-
stand Hölder’s choice of primitive propositions in his axiomatic formulation
of the theory of magnitudes, and in particular of the Archimedean axiom
as a relevant property of magnitudes—even if he had developed an original
non-Archimedean model. Comparing Hölder’s and Veronese’s mathematical
theories, Cantù shows that the different choices made at the axiomatic level
reflect different epistemological frameworks: although they both took inspira-
tion from Pasch, Veronese was interested in the mathematical construction of
a non-standard order relation that is nonetheless compatible with our intuition
of physical objects, while Hölder’s was exclusively interested in the empirical
foundation of measurement.
4 A Bibliography of Hölder’s writings 1
1. Beiträge zur Potentialtheorie, PhD-thesis, Tübingen, 1882.
2. Beweis des Satzes, daß eine eindeutige analytische Function in unendlicher
Nähe einer wesentlich singulären Stelle jedem Wert beliebig nahe kommt,
Math. Annalen, 20, 1882, 138–142.
3. Grenzwerte von Reihen an der Convergenzgrenze, Math. Annalen, 20,
1882, 535–549.
1. Cf. the bibliography provided by [Waerden 1939], which we completed accord-
ing to our best knowledge.
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4. Zum Invariantenbegriff, Math.-naturwiss. Mitteilungen, 1, 1884, 59–65.
5. Zur Theorie der trigonometrischen Reihen, Math. Annalen, 24, 1884,
181–216.
6. Über eine neue hinreichende Bedingung für die Darstellbarkeit einer
Function durch die Fouriersche Reihe, Sitzungsber. preuß. Akad. Berlin,
1885, 419–434.
7. Bemerkung zu der Mitteilung des Herrn Weierstraß: Zur Theorie der
aus n Haupteinheiten gebildeten komplexen Größen, Nachr. Ges. Wiss.
Göttingen, 1886, 241–244.
8. Über eine transcendente Function, Nachr. Ges. Wiss. Göttingen, 1886,
514–522.
9. Über die Eigenschaft der Gammafunktion, keiner algebraischen Differen-
tialgleichung zu genügen, Math. Annalen, 28, 1886, 1–13.
10. Über eine Function, welche keiner algebraischen Functionalgleichung
genügt, Nachr. Ges. Wiss. Göttingen, 1887, 662–676.
11. Zurückführung einer beliebigen algebraischen Gleichung auf eine Kette
von Gleichungen, Math. Annalen, 34, 1889, 26–56.
12. Bemerkungen zur Quaternionentheorie, Nachr. Ges. Wiss. Göttingen,
1889, 34–38.
13. Über einen Mittelwerthssatz, Nachr. Ges. Wiss. Göttingen, 1889, 38–47.
14. Über den Söderbergschen Beweis des Galoisschen Fundamentalsatzes,
Math. Annalen, 34, 1889, 454–462.
15. Über den Casus irreducibilis bei der Gleichung dritten Grades, Math.
Annalen, 38, 1891, 307–312.
16. Die einfachen Gruppen im ersten und zweiten Hundert der Ordnungszah-
len, Math. Annalen, 40, 1892, 55–88.
17. R. Graßmann, Die Zahlenlehre oder Arithmetik, Göttingische gelehrte
Anzeigen 15, 1892, 585–595 [Eng. trans. in this volume, 57–70].
18. Die Gruppen der Ordnungen p3, pq2, pqr, p4, Math. Annalen, 43, 1893,
301–412.
19. Bildung zusammengesetzter Gruppen, Math. Annalen, 46, 1895, 321–422.
20. Die Gruppen mit quadratfreier Ordnungszahl, Nachr. Ges. Wiss.
Göttingen, 1895, 211–229.
21. Über die Prinzipien von Hamilton und Maupertuis, Nachr. Ges. Wiss.
Göttingen, 1896, 122–157.
22. Weierstraß, Mathematische Werke, zweiter Band, Göttinger gelehrte
Anzeigen, 1896, 769–773.
23. Herleitung der elliptischen Funktionen, Schriften phys.-ökon. Ges.
Königsberg, 38, 1897, 53–57.
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24. Galoissche Theorie mit Anwendungen, Enzykl. d. math. Wiss., 1, 1899,
480–520.
25. Anschauung und Denken in der Geometrie. Akademische Antrittsvorle-
sung gehalten am 22. Juli 1899. Mit Zusätzen, Anmerkungen und einem
Register, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1900 [Eng. trans. in this volume, 15–52].
26. Die Axiome der Quantität und die Lehre vom Maß, Ber. sächs. Akad.
Leipzig 53, 1901, 1–64 [Eng. trans.: The axioms of quantity and the
theory of measurement. Translated from the 1901 German original and
with notes by Joel Michell and Catherine Ernst, with an introduction by
Michell, Part 1, J. Math. Psych., 40(3), 1996, 235–252; Part 2, J. Math.
Psych., 41(4), 1997, 345–356].
27. Die Zahlenskala auf der projektiven Geraden und die independente
Geometrie dieser Geraden, Math. Annalen, 65, 1908, 161–260.
28. Adolf Mayer, Nekrolog, gesprochen in der öffentlichen Gesamtsitzung bei-
der Klassen der K. Sächs. Ges. d. Wiss. am 14. Nov. 1908, Ber. sächs.
Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 60, 1908, 353–373.
29. Streckenrechnung und projektive Geometrie, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss.
Leipzig, 63, 1911, 65–183.
30. Bedingungen des analytischen Charakters für reelle Funktionen reellen
Arguments, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 63, 1911, 388–401.
31. Die Cauchysche Randwertaufgabe für den Kreis in der Potentialtheorie,
Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 63, 1911, 477–500.
32. Über einige Determinanten, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 65, 1913,
110–120.
33. Neues Verfahren zur Herleitung der Differentialgleichung für das relative
Extremum eines Integrals, Annali di Mat. (3rd ser.), 20, 1913, 171–184.
34. Über einige Determinanten. Zweite Mitteilung, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss.
Leipzig, 66, 1914, 98–102.
35. Die Arithmetik in strenger Begründung, B. G. Teubner, Leipzig, 1914.
36. Abschätzungen in der Theorie der Differentialgleichungen, in:
C. Carathéodory, G. Hessenberg, E. Landau, L. Lichtenstein, dir.,
Mathematische Abhandlungen. Hermann Amandus Schwarz zu seinem
fünfzigjährigen Doktorjubiläum am 6. Aug. 1914 gewidmet von Freunden
und Schülern, Springer, Berlin, 1914, 116–132.
37. Karl Rohn, Nekrolog, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 72, 1921, 109–127.
38. Carl Neumann zum 90. Geburtstag, Math. Annalen, 86, 1922, 161–162.
39. Die mathematische Methode. Logisch-erkenntnistheoretische Untersu-
chungen im Gebiete der Mathematik, Mechanik und Physik, Springer,
Berlin, 1924.
40. Das Volumen in einer Riemannschen Mannigfaltigkeit und seine
Invarianteneigenschaft, Math. Zeitschr., 20, 1924, 7–20.
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41. Berichtigung zu der Abhandlung: Das Volumen in einer Riemannschen
Mannigfaltigkeit, Bd 20, S. 7–20, Math. Zeitschr., 21, 1924, 160.
42. Über gewisse Hilfssätze der Potentialtheorie und das alternierende
Verfahren von Schwarz, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 77, 1925, 61–73.
43. C. Neumann, Nachruf, gesprochen am 14. November 1925 in der öf-
fentlichen Sitzung beider Klassen, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 77,
1925, 154–172.
44. Der angebliche circulus vitiosus und die sogenannte Grundlagenkrise in
der Analysis, Ber. sächs. Ges, Wiss. Leipzig, 78, 1926, 243–250.
45. Bemerkungen zu meinem Aufsatz: Über gewisse Hilfssätze der Potential-
theorie, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 78, 1926, 240–242.
46. Carl Neumann, Math. Annalen, 96, 1927, 1–25.
47. Über einen Grenzübergang in Abels Recherches sur les Functions
Elliptiques, Journ. f. reine u. angew. Math., 157, 1927, 171–188.
48. Über einige trigonometrische Reihen, S.-B. bayer. Akad. Wiss. München,
1928, 83–96.
49. Bemerkungen über die Herleitung einiger elementarer Formeln, Ber.
sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 80, 1928, 117–121.
50. Über eine von Abel untersuchte Transzendente und eine merkwürdige
Funktionalbeziehung, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 80, 1928, 312–325.
51. Der zweite Mittelwertsatz der Integralrechnung für komplexe Größen,
Math. Annalen, 100, 1928, 438–444.
52. Der indirekte Beweis in der Mathematik, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig,
81, 1929, 201–216.
53. Ein Versuch im Gebiet der höheren Mächtigkeiten, Ber. sächs. Ges.
Wiss. Leipzig, 82, 1930, 83–96.
54. Nachtrag zu meinem Aufsatz über den indirekten Beweis, Ber. sächs.
Ges. Wiss. Leipzig, 82, 1930, 97–104.
55. Einige Sätze über die größten Ganzen, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig,
82, 1930, 159–170.
56. Über gewisse Teilsummen von Σφ(n), Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig,
83, 1931, 175–178.
57. Axiome, empirische Gesetze und mathematische Konstruktionen,
Scientia, 49, 1931, 317–326.
58. Zur Theorie der zahlentheoretischen Funktion µ(n), Ber. sächs. Ges.
Wiss., 83, 1932, 321–328.
59. Über eine Art von Reziprozität bei summatorischen Funktionen, Ber.
sächs. Ges. Wiss., 83, 1932, 329–332.
60. Über einen asymptotischen Ausdruck, Acta math., 59, 1932, 79–89.
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61. Über gewisse der Möbiusschen Funktion µ(n) verwandte zahlen-
theoretische Funktionen, die Dirichletsche Multiplikation und eine
Verallgemeinerung der Umkehrformeln, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss., 85, 1933,
3–28.
62. Zusätzliche Gleichungen zur Hermiteschen Formel, Math. Annalen, 108,
1933, 605–614.
63. Verallgemeinerung einer Dirichletschen Summenumformung, Math.
Zeitschr., 38, 1934, 476–482.
64. Zur Theorie der Gaußschen Summen, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss. Leipzig,
87, 1935, 27–36.
65. Bemerkungen zu einer Dirichletschen Frage, Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss., 87,
1935, 81–84.
66. Verallgemeinerung einer Formel von Hacks, Math. Zeitschr., 40, 1936,
463–468.
67. Zur Theorie der Kreisteilungsgleichung Km(x) = 0, Prace mat.-fiz., 43,
1936, 13–23.
68. Über eine Verallgemeinerung der binomischen Formel, Ber. sächs. Ges.
Wiss., 88, 1936, 61–66.
69. Elementare Herleitung einer dem binomischen Satz verwandten Formel,
Ber. sächs. Ges. Wiss., 88, 1936, 133–134.
70. Über eine Darstellung der Eulerschen Konstanten, Ber. sächs. Ges.
Wiss., 89, 1937, 167–170.
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